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It is more difficult to follow the reasoning of the court in respect
to the other ground on which it based its decision, and which appears
somewhat unusual. The court cites Sections 626 and 629 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts 10 under the topic of Trade Libel.
Section 629 defines "disparagement" as "matter which is intended by
its publisher to be understood or which is reasonably understood to
cast doubt on another's property in lands, chattels or intangible things,
or upon their quality * * *."

Courts in this country have consistently

denied injunctions against trade libels as they have against other libels,"
in order to uphold the constitutional guaranty of freedom of the press.
However, where the libel has been incidental or instrumental to another tortious transaction equity has intervened.' 2 Therefore, it does
not seem in line with the great weight of judicial authorities 13 that
the cause of action should have been sustained on the separate ground
that the defendant was disparaging the plaintiff's business. But the
court may have construed the libelous acts as falling into the latter
category and enjoined them only as an incident of the tort of inducing
the breach of the plaintiff's contract.
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AcT.-(First Case) Defendants -appeal from a
judgment convicting them of smuggling and concealing alcohol and
of conspiracy to do so. An earlier conviction under the same indictment was reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground that the admission of evidence directly procured by means of wire-tapping was
COMMUNICATIONs

Book Co., 97 Fed. 533 (1899) ; Sumwalt Ice & Coal Co. v. Knickerbocker Ice
Co., 114 Md. 403, 80 At. 48 (1911); Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205,
80 N. E. 817 (1907).
10 REsTATEMENT, ToRTs (1938) §§ 626, 629.
31 Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69 (1873); Marlin
Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163 (1902); Balliet v.
Cassidy, 104 Fed. 704 (1900) ; American Malting Co: v. Kreitel, 207 Fed. 351
(C. C. A. 2d, 1913); Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982
(D. C. Mo. 1912) ; (1927) 75 U. oF PA. L. REv. 258, 260.
12 Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 317, 174 N. E. 690 (1931) (Equity does not
interfere to restrain the publication of words on a mere showing of their falsity.
It intervenes in those cases where restraint becomes essential to the preservation
of a business or other property interest thretened with impairment by an illegal
combination or 6-tfier tortious acts, the publication of the words being merely
instrumental and incidental); Gompers v. Buck Stove Co., 221 U. S. 418, 31
Sup. Ct 492 (1910) ; Casey v. Typographical Union, 45 Fed. 135 (C. C. S. D.
Ohio 1891) ; Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307 (1888).
13 Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality
(1915) 29 HARv. L. REv. 640; (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 258.
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illegal 1 and contrary to the Federal Communications Act.2 The Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed the introduction of evidence procured derivatively and made accessible through the forbidden interstate interceptions and has refused to allow the defendants to question its employment. 3 On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, held, one justice dissenting, reversed. The statute interdicts
the derivative use of the tainted evidence as well as the illegal interceptions. Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 60 Sup. Ct. 266
(1939).
(Second Case) Petitioners were convicted for using the mails
to defraud and for conspiracy to defraud. Evidence obtained by federal agents through the interception of intrastate telephone communications was admitted by the trial court. The Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision. 4 On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, held, reversed. Section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act applies to the inadmissibility of intrastate as well as interstate
communications procured by the unauthorized wire-tapping of federal
officers. Weiss v. United States, 308 U. S. 321, 60 Sup. Ct. 269
(1939).
The instant cases concern the efforts of the Federal Government
to utilize evidence obtained by wire-tapping. The decision in each
case hinged on the interpretation of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act. In both cases the prosecution sought to utilize the
evidence made accessible and derived through wire-tappirig, under
the general rule that all relevant evidence is admissible even though
illegally obtained, unless the procurement was 'directly opposed to
public policy as expressed in the Federal Constitution or some federal statute.6 The case of Ohnstead v. United States 6 decided that
1 Nardone

2 48 STAT.

v. United States, 302 U. S.379, 58 Sup. Ct. 275 (1937).
1103, 47 U. S. C. §605 (1934) :

"(1) No person receiving or assisting inreceiving or transmitting,

any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
thereof, except through authorized channels of transmission or reception
to any person other than the addressee, his agent, or attorney, or to a
person employed or authorized to forward such communication to its
destination, * * *; (2) and no person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence,
contents, * ** to any person; (3) and no person not being entitled thereto
shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign communication by wire and use the same or any information therein contained for
his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto; (4)
and no person having received such intercepted communication or having

become acquainted with the contents, substance, * * * shall divulge or

publish the existence, contents, *** for his own benefit or for the benefit
of another not entitled thereto. * * *." (The numerical arrangement of
the clauses is my own.)

F. (2d) 41 (C.C.A.2d, 1939).
103 F. (2d) 348 (C.C.A. 2d, 1939).
G4 WiGMoom, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2183.
6Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.438, 48 Sup. Ct. 564 (1928) (Wiretapping did not violate the "illegal search and seizure" clause. U. S. CoNsT.
3106
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neither wire-tapping nor its employment as evidence was contrary to
the Constitution. Consequently, the only remaining ground for an
exclusion depended on the construction of Section 605.
The United States Supreme Court, without resorting to a technical interpretation of the legislation, reasoned that Congress had been
faced with an ethical problem, and that the law was primarily designed as a remedial measure to curb the evils arising from wiretapping, which were causing the loss of individual freedom, and the
destruction of personal liberty. Although admitting that any claim
for the exclusion of evidence was carefully scrutinized, the Court declared that "the essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired
shall not be used before the court but that it shall not be used at all." 7
It was further held that the burden of proof with regard to the unlawful use of wire-tapping rested on the accused and that any objection to the use of such illegal evidence must be timely and not a
"feeler" as to the prosecution's case.
The Weiss case was brought before the Supreme Court to make
a final ruling with regard to the conflict that had arisen in the Circuit
Courts of Appeal as to whether Section 605 prohibited intrastate as
well as interstate wire-tapping. The First Circuit Court 8 favored the
admission of intrastate interceptions as evidence on the ground that
Section 605 only applied to the inadmissibility of interstate evidence.
The Third 9 and Sixth 10 Circuits opposed it by holding that the purpose of the section was remedial and regulatory, and therefore should
be liberally construed. Having adopted the latter view in deciding
the Nardone case," the Court pursued the same line of reasoning and
found that both interstate and intrastate wire-tapping were intended
to be interdicted by the second clause of the sectioni.2 The words
"any communication" were meant to include interstate and intrastate
communications. Such legislation was within the power of Congress
under the "commerce clause" of the Constitution. 13 The assent of
the defendants to the wire-tapping in the hope of leniency, after being
Amend. IV. Wire-tapping did not compel a defendant "to be a witness against
himself". U. S. CoNsT. Amend. V).
7Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S.385, 392, 40 Sup. Ct.
182 (1920).
s Valli v. United States, 94 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A. 1st, 1938).
9 Sablowsky v. United States, 101 F. (2d) 183 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
10 Diamond v. United States, 94 F. (2d) 1012 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938) ; see
(1939)

14 ST.Jo HN's L. REV. 179.

11 Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S.338, 60 Sup. Ct. 266 (1939).

12

"*

* * and no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept

any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, * * * to any
person, * * *"

13 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8. "The Congress shall have the power * ** to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states and with
the Indian tribes * * *." Congress can regulate intrastate commerce when nec-

essary to protect interstate commerce.
U. S.20, 32 Sup. Ct. 2 (1911).

Southern Ry. v. United States, 222
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confronted with the evidence, was not deemed a sufficient satisfaction
of the authorization clause of the section.
Meaning has been given to what Congress has written so as to
accomplish the policy that Congress formulated. 14 It appears that
enforcement of the criminal law and the protection of rights of privacy
granted by the Constitution have been harmoniously fused.
A. B.

GIFTs CAUSA MORTIS-TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION AS AFFECTING WIDOWS' STATUTORY RIGHT.-Administrator of deceased seeks

to have a trust declared with respect to a sum given by decedent to
the defendant, his brother, shortly before the decedent's death, contending said transaction to be a gift causa nwrtis 1 and as such is testamentary in character and must be subject to rights which the law
grants to widows. 2 The evidence established that deceased having
become so ill that "death could be expected at any time" gave said
gift, the sum of two thousand dollars, to defendant "so that he could
have it in case anything happened". Defendant maintains that said
14 "Congress may have thought it less important that some offenders go
unwhipped of justice than that officers should resort to methods deemed inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty." Nardone v.
United States, 302 U. S. 379, 383, 58 Sup. Ct. 275, 277 (1937).
1 Donatio morlis causa is defined as: "A gift made by a person in sickness,
who apprehending his dissolution near, delivers, or causes to be delivered, to
another the possession of any personal goods, to keep as his own in case of
donor's decease. 2 BL. Comm. 514. The civil law defines it to be a gift under
apprehension of death; as when anything is given upon condition that, if the
donor dies, the donee shall possess it absolutely, or return it if the donee should
survive or should repent having made the gift, or if the donee should die before
the donor." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933) 612. In Gymes v. Hone,
49 N. Y. 17, 20 (1892), the court in defining gifts causa vnortis said: "Three
things are necessary. 1. It must be made with a view to donor's death. 2. The
donor must die of that ailment or peril. 3. There must be a delivery." Where
donor feared death from an operation but died from a heart attack the court
held that a valid gift causa mortis was created despite the fact that donor died
from a different ailment or peril. Redden v. Thrall, 125 N. Y. 572, 26 N. E.
627 (1890).
A gift causa inortis where donor took his own life was held invalid as
against public policy. Bainbridge v. Hoes, 163 App. Div. 870, 149 N. Y. Supp.
20 (2d Dept. 1914).
2 It is fundamental that the law always seeks to provide for a widow from
the estate of her deceased husband. Today this tendency is strongly evidenced
by the New York statutes in relation thereto. See N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE
LAW §§ 18, 83. N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 18 amounts in effect to a statutory limitation on the power of an owner to direct the mode of distribution of
his net estate subsequent to his death, and renders invalid as to a surviving
spouse, at his or her election, a will, which is executed after the effective date of
this section, and which fails to make the specified minimum provision for his or
her benefit. In re Lavine's Will, 167 Misc. 879, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 923 (1938).

